Contextualizing neuro-collaborations: reflections on a transdisciplinary fMRI lie detection experiment by Melissa M. Littlefield et al.
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY ARTICLE
published: 31 March 2014
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00149
Contextualizing neuro-collaborations: reﬂections on a
transdisciplinary fMRI lie detection experiment
Melissa M. Littleﬁeld 1,2*, Des Fitzgerald 3,4 , Kasper Knudsen5, JamesTonks6 and Martin J. Dietz 7
1 Department of Kinesiology and Community Health, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA
2 Department of English, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA
3 Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine, Kings College London, London, UK
4 Interacting Minds Center, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
5 Department of Culture and Society, Section for Anthropology and Ethnography, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
6 Dame Hannah Rogers Trust and Department of Psychology, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK
7 Center for Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Institute of Clinical Medicine, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
Edited by:
Jan Slaby, Freie Universität Berlin,
Germany
Reviewed by:
Martyn Pickersgill, University of
Edinburgh, UK
Stephan Schleim,
Ludwig-Maximilians-University
Munich, Germany
*Correspondence:
Melissa M. Littleﬁeld, Department of
Kinesiology and Community Health,
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign, 608 South
Goodwin Avenue, Urbana, IL 61801,
USA
e-mail: mml@illinois.edu
Recent neuroscience initiatives (including the E.U.’s Human Brain Project and the U.S.’s
BRAIN Initiative) have reinvigorated discussions about the possibilities for transdisciplinary
collaboration between the neurosciences, the social sciences, and the humanities. As STS
scholars have argued for decades, however, such inter- and transdisciplinary collaborations
are potentially fraught with tensions between researchers.This essay build on such claims
by arguing that the tensions of transdisciplinary research also exist within researchers’ own
experiences of working between disciplines − a phenomenon that we call “disciplinary
double consciousness” (DDC). Building on previous work that has characterized similar
spaces (and especially on the Critical Neuroscience literature), we argue that “neuro-
collaborations” inevitably engage researchers in DDC − a phenomenon that allows us to
explore the useful dissonance that researchers can experience when working between a
“home” discipline and a secondary discipline. Our case study is a ﬁve-year research project
in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) lie detection involving a transdisciplinary
research team made up of social scientists, a neuroscientist, and a humanist. In addition
to theorizing neuro-collaborations from the inside-out, this essay presents practical
suggestions for developing transdisciplinary infrastructures that could support future
neuro-collaborations.
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It is unlikely that disciplinary coherence can be maintained in these
new circumstances
“Discipline” (Turner, 2006, 186)
The recent U.S. BRIAN Initiative and the E.U. Human Brain
Project (HBP) have been likened to the Human Genome Project
in scope and potential for revolutionary change(s) to medicine,
neuroscience, and computing.1 Amidst the hype is also the real
hope that a centralized system for collaboration between neuro-
scientiﬁc disciplines, around speciﬁc, large-scale neuroscientiﬁc
projects, will produce better results in less time. As the HBP
“Overview” describes it, “one of the major obstacles to under-
standing the human brain is the fragmentation of brain research
and the data it produces. Our most urgent need is thus a con-
certed international effort. . . to integrate this data in a uniﬁed
picture of the brain as a single multi-level system” (Human Brain
Project, 2014a). For the U.S.-based BRAIN Initiative, the focus
differs (from building a model of the brain to mapping brain
connections), but the sense of collaborative exigency persists,
“[recent] discoveries have yieldedunprecedentedopportunities for
1See for example, http://www.theguardian.com/science/2013/oct/15/human-brain-
project-henry-markram
integration across scientiﬁc ﬁelds” (National Institutes of Health,
BRAIN Initiative, 2014). The basis for both programs is large-scale,
transdisciplinary collaborations. Or, to quote Karlheinz Meier’s
contribution to the “What People are Saying” scroll-bar at the bot-
tom of the HBP homepage: “Collaborate, collaborate, collaborate.
This is our opportunity” (Human Brain Project, 2014b).
As research in Science and Technology Studies has demon-
strated, collaboration is often easier to imagine and/or critique
than to enact. Discussions of “Trading Zones” (Galison, 1997;
Collins et al., 2007), transdisciplinarity (Nicolescu, 2008; Frazzetto
and Anker, 2009; Frazzetto, 2011), and boundary work (Gieryn,
1983, 1996, 1999) have mapped some of the difﬁculties of working
together – particularly when that work requires crossing disci-
plinary lines. Discussions of interdisciplinarity’s complex history
and relation to other (multi-, trans-, and cross-) disciplinary
mergers have helped to reveal the multiplicity of research that
translates across the social and natural sciences (Barry and Born,
2013). Likewise, numerous inter-/transdisciplinary projects have
both tested the limits of collaborative endeavors and engen-
dered novel theorizations of what it means to work between
departments and disciplines. In this vein, we might look at collab-
orations whose continuing mission is increased reﬂexivity, such
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as Simon Penny’s work on the Arts Computational Engineering
Program at UC Irvine2 and research centers such as the Center
for Nanotechnology in Society at ASU.3 In short, the collab-
orative happenings with/in the neurosciences are not a novel
phenomenon, and, indeed, they recall larger and longer conver-
sations about the fraught intersections between biology−and the
social sciences (Benton, 1991; Williams et al., 2003; Meloni, 2013;
Rose, 2013). While the neurosciences have always already enacted
collaborations between scientiﬁc and clinical ﬁelds (e.g., biology,
chemistry, physics, psychology), an emergent suite of cosmopoli-
tan “neurodisciplines” (centering on neuroscience, but moving
into the concerns of the humanities and social sciences, as well as
other natural sciences) have reinvigorated discussions concerning
transdisciplinarity. These neurodisciplines have also bolstered our
capacities for collaborative research models that bring together
the neurosciences, humanities, and social sciences (Choudhury
and Slaby, 2011; Pickersgill and Van Keulen, 2011; Littleﬁeld and
Johnson, 2012; Ortega and Vidal, 2012; Rose and Abi-Rached,
2013).
But if these neuro-conversations−and others−have led to con-
ceptual, historical and bioethical analyses of neuroethics (Racine
et al., 2005), neurorhetorics (Pruchnic, 2008 and Jack, 2012), and
the proliferation of the neurodisciplines, there is less discussion
about the practical infrastructures that actually make such neuro-
collaboration possible. Beginning that discussion is the goal of this
paper. In a related analysis, we have considered some of the affec-
tive and political components of actually doing a transdisciplinary
neuroscience (Fitzgerald et al., 2014). In this paper, by contrast, we
re-focus on the infrastructural pragmatics of neuro-collaboration,
and its relationship to neuroscience as such. In what follows, we
introduce the term“neuro-collaboration”as shorthand for myriad
working groups that attempt to pragmatically splice together the
neurosciences, the humanities, and the social sciences. Our pur-
pose here is not to deﬁne or circumscribewhat these collaborations
might look like; instead, we focus on the complications of collab-
orations that bring various external disciplines into conversation
with the neurosciences.4
One possible rubric for neuro-collaboration that has risen to
prominence since its introduction in 2009 is Critical Neuroscience
(Choudhury et al., 2009). The nescient ﬁeld of Critical Neuro-
science has proposed direct intervention in neuroscientiﬁc studies
in order “to push experimental work in alternative directions”
(Choudhury and Slaby, 2011, 13). However, and as this special
2See, for example, Simon Penny’s work on the ASE Program – in particular his
essays “Rigorous Interdisciplinary Pedagogy: Five Years at ACE” (Penny, 2008b) and
“Bridging Two Cultures: Towards an Interdisciplinary History of the Artist-Inventor
and the Machine Artwork” (Penny, 2008a).
3TheCNSatASUwebsitemaintains that“The guiding conceptual goals of CNS-ASU
are two-fold: to increase reﬂexivity within nanotechnology research and to increase
society’s capacity to engage in anticipatory governance of nanotechnology and other
emerging technologies. Through this improved contextual awareness, we can help
guide the path of nanotechnology knowledge and innovation toward more socially
desirable outcomes and away from undesirable ones.” (http://cns.asu.edu/about).
For scholarship concerning nanotechnology’s interdisciplinarity, (see Porter and
Youtie, 2009a,b).
4Other terms, such as “neuroscholar” (Johnson and Littleﬁeld, 2011), have been
suggested for these kinds of collaboration, but are, as yet, under-theorized for this
kind of application.
issue implies, there is still a live question about the degree to which
such collaborations between the neurosciences and the humani-
ties and/or social sciences may actually produce something new.
Do these collaborators bring “critical” interventions to the neu-
rosciences that are/were lacking? Or, is there a real possibility,
given the hierarchical structuring of the academy, that neuro-
collaborations might just be another term for neuroscience? We
raise these questions because it is not always clear what neuro-
collaborations look like in an extended application; moreover,
we do not yet know what types of tangible results researchers
can expect – or even hope for – from these kinds of collabora-
tions. Critical Neuroscience is a helpful starting point; but, thus
far, it underestimates − or has not yet accounted for − forms of
action, consciousness and subjectivity that are required for work-
ing through collaborative domains where, as per the emerging
neurodisciplines, neither prestige nor resources nor insights are
distributed evenly. And because of such asymmetries, the rela-
tionship between “neuro-collaboration” and “neuroscience” is not
always clear. That relationship is at the heart of what follows.
In this paper, we contend that extended deployments in other
disciplines for the purpose of neuro-collaboration(s) can cause a
sense of what we call disciplinary double consciousness (DDC)
among research team members (cf. Hurley, 2003, 7). In order
to prevent neuro-collaborations−or “Critical Neuroscience,” for
that matter−from becoming, simply, neuroscience, research team
members may need to learn not only how to recognize the symp-
toms of DDC, but also to experience DDC as a useful collaborative
position and tool. In this context, we contend that DDC can be
productive and informative, even as it reveals hierarchical power
relations between the neurosciences and its potential humani-
ties and social science collaborators. Our arguments are based
on a ﬁve year experimental collaboration between a neuroscien-
tist, a humanist, and several social scientists that was originally
intended to challenge current functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) lie detection paradigms, but which also turned
into a meta-experiment in neuro-collaboration.5
LITERATURE REVIEW: DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS WITHIN
THE TRADING ZONES
Properly speaking, amanhas asmany social selves as there are individuals
who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind. [... ] From
this, there results what practically is a division of the man into several
selves; this may be a discordant splitting, as where one is afraid to let
one set of his acquaintances know him as he is elsewhere; or it may be
a perfectly harmonious division of labor, as where one tender to his
children is stern to the soldiers or prisoners under his command.
William James, Principles of Psychology, 1890, 294
The term “double consciousness” has a long history, typically
associated with the experience of African American racialized
identities, becoming particularly salient in the wake of the Amer-
ican civil war (Du Bois, 1994). For W. E. B. Du Bois, “double
consciousness” describes how African-American identities are
informed by and through the contemptuous eyes of another−the
5Participants who were involved in the fMRI studies provided written informed
consent as approved by the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign Institutional
Review Board (#10084) and the Aarhus University Ethics Board.
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white ruling class; for example. Through his famous image of
“the veil,” Du Bois captures precisely the simultaneous feeling
of being both inside and outside an identity, a nation, a cul-
ture, an historical experience − and the intellectual and affective
labors of tacking back and forth between such senses of dou-
bling. Recently, scholars have drawn on Du Bois’s account to
describe myriad subcultures in which identity and subjectivity
are also suspended in complex and doubled relationships with
often-oppressive-but-inescapable larger cultures: female boxers
at the turn of the twentieth century (Gammel, 2012), the place
of “character” and moral responsibility in criminal law (Lacey,
2010), and the relationship between the ideal and the real in nine-
teenth century literature (Mills, 2011), just to name a few. This
expansive use of double consciousness inspires our application to
neuro-collaborations.
Likewise, our use of double consciousness derives in part from
the scientiﬁc genealogies of the term from which Du Bois may
have drawn his theories about the feeling of African-American
identity in the United States. As Dickson D. Bruce Jr. (and Arnold
Rampersad before him) have articulated, Du Bois’s double con-
sciousness drew from at least two traditions, one ﬁgurative and
one medical: on the one hand, European Romanticism and Amer-
ican Transcendentalism and, on the other, the then-emerging ﬁeld
of psychology. In his essay, “W. E. B. Du Bois and the Idea of
Double Consciousness,” Bruce (1992) contends that “as a medi-
cal term “double consciousness” already had a long history by the
1890s, having been the subject of rather extensive experimentation
and debate for at least seventy-ﬁve years” (303). He explores this
history of the term via William James, who was one of Du Bois’s
mentors while Du Bois studied at Harvard, and older histories that
have roots in the 1817 case of Mary Reynolds, a woman who had
at least two distinct consciousness that alternated over a 15 year
period in her life.
That “double consciousness” is, itself, a term with a complex
(and simultaneous) disciplinary, scientiﬁc and political history is
relevant to our owndiscussions.Wedonot drawanalogies between
racialized and disciplinary identities. Nonetheless, given the cur-
rent state of the academy as a micro-world of power and prestige
divided along non-natural but still hard lines of disciplinarity, we
want to draw on Du Bois’s conceptual framework. DDC illumi-
nates the sense, throughout this experience, of being not quite
one thing nor another, of being captured within the powerful
categorical gaze of some other rubric, and of learning to make
ourselves, and our intellectual identities, as neither quite scientist
or non-scientist, as both object and ally of some hardly seen exter-
nal force. This also jibes well with William James’ theorizations
of double or alternating consciousness, to which we will turn in a
moment.
We deﬁne DDC as the sensation of dissonance experienced
(cognitively, affectively, conceptually, or otherwise) by being
caught between a “home” discipline and position as a scholar
on an extended deployment in some secondary discipline; the
position−and the term−are contingent on a series of historically-
and socially embedded disparities between disciplinary methods,
practices, and theoretical foundations. The more radical the dis-
parity has been made to be, the larger the sense of DDC. Here,
we have chosen the term“deployment” to describe the experiences
of humanists and social scientists who are working in the neuro-
sciences because it captures the physical transition from one space
to another, potentially from one culture to another. The term also
captures the quasi-militaristic and action-oriented aspects of the
project at hand: to not only strategically inhabit another discipline,
but also prompt action that results in transdisciplinary outcomes.
We note here that DDC is not limited to neuro-collaborations and,
indeed, could be applied tomyriad collaborative situations. Due to
limitations of space, we focus here on neuro-collaborations specif-
ically, but believe future scholarship should be build outward to
other ﬁelds and collaborative endeavors.
According to William James’s analysis, one’s sense of double
or alternating consciousness has several possible causes, includ-
ing individual pathology, but also extending to infrastructural
systems. As he notes in The Principles of Psychology, “we must
admit that organized systems of paths can be thrown out of gear
with others, so that the processes in one system give rise to one
consciousness, and those of another system to another simulta-
neously existing consciousness” (James, 1890, 399). In this brief
statement, the implications for disciplinarity become articulable:
we can extrapolate that organized systems of paths, including
modern disciplines have been “thrown out of gear with others”
through the various processes of boundary construction, exper-
tise building, and professionalization. Scholars working in one
ﬁeld are introduced to and indoctrinated in one system or con-
sciousness may ﬁnd that they not only experience a different
consciousness when working between disciplines, but that they
experience the multiplicity of consciousness simultaneously, a
position that is irreducible to one or another epistemology or
ontology.
The conception of a simultaneously existing consciousness
sheds new light on theorizations of collaboration, particularly
notions of trading zones (Galison, 1997; Collins et al., 2007) and,
more recently, Critical Neuroscience. First, the notion of trad-
ing zones, as it has been rearticulated by Collins et al. (2007)
argues that there are distinct relationships between disciplinary
players when they work in or simply meet at disciplinary bor-
ders. Collins et al. (2007) divide Galison’s original conception of
the trading zone into four parts: Inter-Language, Fractures, Sub-
versive, and Enforced (2007, 659). Each represents a differential
distribution of power and expertise between ﬁelds. If we were to
place the recent surge in neuro-collaborations on such a chart,
we might locate them somewhere between Fractured and Subver-
sive: not yet a recognized creole like the nanosciences, but not
as coercive as the slave/master relation in the Enforced category.
However, within the Fractured and Subversive categories−two
locations that might describe neuro-collaborations−what is less
explicit are the disciplinary consciousnesses of researchers work-
ing within such paradigms. Collins et al. (2007) approach this
issue by noting that there is a particular−and special−place for
the scholar who can move ﬂuidly between ﬁelds: “indeed, it
is precisely the continuing discontinuity between the cultures
that enables the individual with interactional expertise, and who
thus has a mastery of both languages, to maintain their special
role” (Collins et al., 2007, 662, our emphasis). What Collins and
his colleagues pay less attention to, however, are the subjective
experiences of human beings working across these boundaries,
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and the role of such experience in boundary-formation; the dis-
tinctions they describe, and the communities that make them
up, are both enacted and lived as forms of subjectivity and con-
sciousness. Thus we draw attention to the way that consciousness
might be an unexplored site for illuminating the trafﬁc between
disciplines, as well as the barriers to that trafﬁc. In particu-
lar, we explore how shifts in consciousness might both sustain
and mediate the very boundaries that Collins and his colleagues
throw into relief. If we ﬁnd the interactional polyglot researcher
an enticing ﬁgure, we also wonder about the degree to which
she may experience a strong sense of DDC – an experience
that might well account for her special role in the collaborative
team.
Likewise, it is imperative that we recognize the power of DDC
to disrupt the transmogriﬁcation of a fractured trading zone into
a homogeneous one. Collins et al. (2007); note that
Over an even longer time period it may even be the case that, as with
biochemistry, a distinct new discipline emerges. [...] This possibility
is realized when departments are set up, textbooks are produced and
what was once a radical and innovative experiment becomes a normal
science research program.... New recruits to the discipline will now
ﬁnd the cultural hegemony so strong that they have no choice but
to abandon any ideas they bring with them and accept the dominant
culture. Anything strange sucked into its domain will be subverted by
the dominant culture of the new science.
(Collins et al., 2007, 663–664)
As we have already mentioned, neuro-collaborations have
the potential to turn into something else, including, simply,
neuroscience. But our suggestion is that the recognition and
productive use of DDC may also make this transition less auto-
matic and more fraught−something that could help maintain the
transdisciplinary, or even critical neuroscientiﬁc edge of neuro-
collaborations. In short, there might be more than hegemony
(i.e., simply doing neuroscience) at stake over “the Western
horizon.” Maintaining attention to the role of consciousness,
and its potential for producing/living with a form of doubling
introduces a new way to think about the development of this
taxonomy.
Thus, for Critical Neuroscience, which assumes the poten-
tial for an inter-language trading zone, if not a creole discipline,
the existence or experience of DDC could help to guard against
a slippage into neuroscience as such. In the call for transdisci-
plinary research teams, Critical Neuroscience could incorporate
a record of DDC as a useful third position. According to such
a model, collaboration implies the recognition, if not creation,
of a transdisciplinary space that is irreducible to any one ﬁeld.
Choudhury and Slaby (2011) argue that “practitioners of Critical
Neuroscience might temporarily form speciﬁc project groups to
collaborate for a certain time on speciﬁc topics, thereby apply-
ing all the relevant tools to trace the trajectory of a given theme or
brain“fact”and to plan new experiments where relevant” (Choud-
hury et al., 2009, 69). If we revise this statement to reﬂect DDC,
we would articulate that this relationship is neither temporary
nor is it centrally ﬁxated on the neurosciences; instead, we have
come to understand it as an extended deployment intent on mov-
ing beyond and outside of the often dominant natural sciences.
Indeed, focusing on the formation of disciplinary consciousness
reminds us that aggregation is not only at the level of groups of
individuals − that aggregation might also be a question of one
person’s subjectivity, a function within the individual, and not
only a product of her interactions. So in this sense, collaboration
does not stop at the boundaries of the body − it is an interior
process of churn too, irrespective of what Collins et al. (2007) call
hegemony.
CASE STUDY: NEURO-COLLABORATION IN AN fMRI LIE
DETECTION EXPERIMENT
Our research group met for the ﬁrst time at a small hotel in
Vienna. The authors were among a small group of early career
scholars invited to participate in a new kind of event: a “Neu-
roschool” sponsored by the European Neuroscience and Society
Network (ENSN). The ENSN was funded by the European Sci-
ence Foundation for ﬁve years between 2007–2012, and was
initiated and chaired by a team from the BIOS Centre, then
afﬁliated with the London School of Economics. Under their
rubric of “mutual exchange” (King’s College London, 2007a) the
ENSN sponsored four Neuroschools (Rome 2008, Vienna 2009,
Wurzburg 2010, Bergen 2011), which sought theoretically−and
practically−to redress the problems of education and train-
ing across disciplinary divides. While the school’s name gives
notable weight to the “neuro” part of the equation, the ENSN’s
larger goal of transdisciplinarity is explicitly locatable within the
environs of the Neuroschools: “Intended for early career neuro-
scientists and social scientists, Neuroschools offer a symmetrically
transdisciplinary environment for cross-tutoring and sharing of
ideas and for innovative, critical thinking about key issues in
modern neuroscience” (King’s College London, 2007b). Here,
discourses of mutual exchange stud the description: “symmet-
rically transdisciplinary environment,” “cross-tutoring,” and the
“sharing of ideas.” In short, the ENSN Neuroschools sought
to foster research environments that do not simply bring disci-
plines together (interdisciplinarity), but fundamentally change the
involved disciplines in some respect producing transdisciplinarity
(Frazzetto, 2011).
During this initial three-day meeting, our team won a compe-
tition for experimental funding. In conjunction with the ENSN,
Andreas Roepstorff, now Director of the Interacting Minds Cen-
ter and then, an anthropologist turned neuroscientist, offered the
winners of the experimental competition an opportunity to carry
out their experiment without having to seek additional funding.
This created a less constrictive setting in which we could think
transformatively about experimental paradigms−outside the con-
ﬁnes of normal funding structures bounded by disciplinarity. This,
we admit, is a unique and enviable position in many respects−a
situation that is not likely to occur again without an opening of
disciplinary boundaries and institutional purses. However, and as
we will detail in a moment, while the ENSN experimental com-
petition represented the opportunity to ﬁnd access to equipment,
training, and the sense that humanists and social scientists could
be important−if not equal−players in the experimental process,
the practical reality of collaboration raised more questions than
it answered (See our related paper – Fitzgerald et al., 2014 − for
a fuller discussion of this event, and of the experiment that was
designed).
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During the subsequent ﬁve years, our research group (made up
of social scientists, a neuroscientist, and a humanist) designed
and executed an fMRI experiment that was intended to chal-
lenge current lie detection paradigms by inverting assumptions
about “truth” as a baseline for human cognition. On its sur-
face, our experiment questioned extant fMRI studies that deﬁne
lying as the suppression of a known truth (Spence et al., 2001,
2004; Langleben et al., 2002, 2005; Ganis et al., 2003; Mohamed
et al., 2006). Such studies do not situate lying in its often vari-
able and dynamic social contexts, nor do they address the social
and ethical implications of characterizing truth-telling as more
biologically efﬁcient. As a challenge to these studies, we hypothe-
sized that “truth” can be a multi-faceted variable; that some forms
of truth-telling may require elevated activation in areas of the
brain associated with executive function, (decision making, plan-
ning, problem-solving and assigning priority) and theory of mind
(ToM; the ability to perceive the emotional state of others and the
likely social consequences of that state). In short, we hypothesized
that truth may not be a suitable baseline or control variable. And,
indeed, our experimental ﬁndings indicated that socially stressful
truth-telling can activate portions of the brain that are associ-
ated with ToM and complex decision making (Littleﬁeld et al.,
in preparation).
Yet, even as we completed what was−by many measures−a
“successful” experiment, our ﬁndings led us to more deeply ques-
tion the very basis of our experimental endeavor. Indeed, our
transdisciplinary collaboration was also an intervention and an
experiment at another level: a self-conscious enactment of, and
practice in, the emergent practice of neuro-collaboration. In a
related paper, we explore some of the pragmatic and affective
labor involved in this enactment, particularly as it relates to how
we conceive of “deception,” and how this category helps us to think
more broadly about institutional rubrics of inter- and transdisci-
plinarity (Fitzgerald et al., 2014). In the present paper, we focus
more precisely on the experience of DDC among the researchers
involved.
Disciplinary double consciousness has been at work for us from
our initial 2009 meeting in Vienna to our data analysis session in
January 2013 and beyond; ﬁve years of living a kind of double
life, having to explain ourselves to neuroscientists, humanists, and
social scientists alike, and having to consistently understand and
articulate ourselves through their expectations. Schematically, we
break this ﬁve-year collaboration into three distinct periods dur-
ing which we experienced different aspects of DDC: (1) designer,
(2) data collector, and (3) analyst. The three instances of DDC
we describe in this paper are exemplary moments (among many
others) through which we now recognize how our own emergent
DDC helped us to create, enact, and sustain this transdisciplinary
experiment.
DESIGNER OR HOW ORIGINAL CONCEPTIONS MET UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES
The experiment on socially stressful truth was ﬁrst conceived as
a counter-point to current research on fMRI lie detection. If we
were able to demonstrate our hypothesis (in part or in full), we
hoped to challenge – but certainly not improve – current fMRI lie
detection research. Therein lies the Hegelian rub, which we only
later realized: that if we were to use the master’s tools (fMRI) to
dismantle the master’s house (lie detection paradigms) we could
also, potentially, aid in the production of a better house. But it
was only by learning to experience our DDC that this double-
bind became apparent. Let us examine each issue in turn: our
ideal goal of upsetting current fMRI lie detection paradigms was,
admittedly, somewhat naïve. As Kuhn (1970) argued, paradigm
shifts are rare and must contend with the established world-
view of scientiﬁc disciplines. Moreover, one experiment on the
variations of “truth” would not necessarily be replicable and/or
applicable to the paradigms of lie detection research that have
stood for over a century. However, in our enthusiasm to create
an experiment, access the tools of the neurosciences, and inter-
vene in (what we continue to see as) a problematic paradigm, our
disciplined selves did not look over or through several alternate
possibilities.
It was a research participant who, in fact, taught us how to
experience our DDC here. After learning the true (ideal) purpose
of the experiment during a debrieﬁng session, a male participant
called back the following day to ask that his data be withdrawn
from the experiment because he disagreed with current lie detec-
tion research and wanted no part in making a better lie detector.
We were all taken aback: wasn’t that the exact opposite of what
we were doing? None of us would have invested so many years in
this experiment if it was simply going to create a better lie detec-
tor. So, we asked the participant if he would be willing to discuss
his concerns with the research team. After a long discussion, in
which we assured him that we were absolutely invested in (as we
loftily termed it) “debunking” fMRI lie detection research, assured
him that at least one member of the team (Littleﬁeld; a human-
ist) had published papers and a book on the cultural history of
lie detection technologies, and asked for his input on the partici-
pant side of the experiment, he enthusiastically agreed to remain
part of the study.6 Regardless of his participation in the exper-
iment, his participation in this post-experiment discussion was,
perhaps, one of the single-most deﬁning moments of DDC for the
research team. His concerns recalled us to not only the problem at
hand, but our own potential complicity within fMRI lie detection
paradigms.
As (literature) science and technology studies scholars, we
believed in the potential of multiplicity and critical analysis; how-
ever, we had failed to see that our participation could also be
read very differently: that once the scientiﬁc paper was pub-
lished it could be used in ways that were never intended at the
experiment’s conception. And this was not only a question of
perception−having poked at the veil of strict disciplinarity, we had
very much left ourselves open to a very different system of appre-
hension and exchange to the one we had previously imagined.
On the one hand, we still hoped to challenge fMRI lie detection
paradigms; on the other, we had to confront the possibility that
our position as neuroscientiﬁc experimenters was either antithet-
ical to and/or negated the potential of our experimental ideals.
Between these two, we learned that we were far from the masters
6Ultimately this participant was part of the ﬁrst experimental run for which we lost
all of the data-stimuli correlations; so, his data is not included in the analysis or
subsequently published papers.
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of our destiny in this moment – that we had opened our work
to the gaze of some other force, and one that was not always
benign.
Here, and as we explore in the next examples, our sense of
DDC retroactively helped us to explore and explain our conﬂicted
positionality. DDC did not emerge immediately, but developed as
our experience of working between ﬁelds continually complicated
our ability to retreat to the relative stability of our home disci-
plines. As William James intimated, our experiences illustrated
some of the ways that organized systems “can be thrown out of
gear with others, so that the processes in one system give rise to
one consciousness, and those of another system to another simul-
taneously existing consciousness” (James, 1890, 399). As designers,
we had not anticipated the schism with which we were confronted.
This does not mean it was avoidable, but, instead, that it should
have been predictable. Such predictability could – and can – draw
experiences of DDC to the surface, thus exposing the role of the
polyglot researcher and exposing what makes her such a valuable –
if troubled – experimenter.
DATA COLLECTOR OR NOVICES TRYING ON LAB COATS
The dissonance between our hopes for the experiment and the
potential reality of its reception was indeed jarring, but it was part
and parcel of our position as expert-novices – in neuroscience
and neuro-collaboration. Our apprenticeship began early at the
Vienna Neuroschool as we took on the role of students: (quite
literally) listening to lectures on physics, taking ﬁeld trips to visit
various scanners, and planning group presentations to be given
in front of our instructors. But it was at Aarhus University while
collecting data in the magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) bunker
at the hospital that those of us who were not neuroscientists were
faced with our limited capacity with the technologies at hand. As
a motley crew of scholars embarking into undeﬁned disciplinary
territory, we keenly felt our tenuous position: we had to trust in the
expertise of a radiographer, a neuroscientist, and a very large mag-
net. Despite our years – sometimes decades – of training in our
respective disciplines, we were forced to ask: why should, and how
does one maintain one’s expertise in the face of such galling inex-
perience? And what happens when one scholar/discipline defers
to another?
For transdisciplinary neuro-collaborators, relative levels of
expertise can contribute to a sense of DDC. In home disciplines,
one’s expertise leads to credibility via systems of course work,
examinations, credentialing, recognition by other experts, experi-
ence, and publications. In neuro-collaborations, expertise – and
by extension, credibility−have yet to be deﬁned: are the neuro-
scientists the experts? Are the humanists? The social scientists?
How can such diverse expertise become mutually beneﬁcial and
recognized? Without external mechanisms for determining rela-
tive authority, other hierarchies begin to ﬁll in the gaps. Take, for
example, our experiences at the ENSN “Neuroschool” in Vienna.
In practice, the Vienna Neuroschool of 2009 created an open
learning environment that allowed for the exchange of ideas;
however, its curriculum was geared toward educating humanists
and social scientists about the neurosciences and not necessar-
ily vice versa. For example, participants attended lectures on the
physics of MRI and fMRI, visited several scanners and learned
about experimental design; but they received less speciﬁc train-
ing on sociological or humanistic concepts. In other words, the
school’s program was somewhat asymmetrical. Given the politics
of funding and epistemic prestige in the contemporary academy,
neuro-collaboration requires social scientists and humanists to go
further−to not only build the necessary bridges, but cross them;
neuro-collaborations are not yet about meeting in the middle, but
they should be (see Fitzgerald et al., 2014, for an elaboration of this
theme).
In our group, this created a default asymmetry of education
and accommodation. The non-neuroscientist members of the
group had to learn to speak the language of neuroscience; while
our team’s neuroscientist did not necessarily need to expand his
knowledge-base to include sociology or literature, science, and
technology studies.Whenweworked at thewhite board, our team’s
neuroscientist usually held the pen, leaving the remaining group
members to play the role of students: novices whose primary role
was to ask questions, learn concepts, and – ultimately –accept
some normative neuroscientiﬁc knowledge if the study were to
have any validity in neuroscience circles. While playing this role,
our individual expertise often lay fallow while the paradigm and
its components were worked out. There were speciﬁc exceptions to
this position, we realized that our team had a particular advantage
in its formative stage during theVienna competition, aswe lacked a
neuroscientist whowas trained in functional imaging. Wewatched
as several of the other groups experienced in-ﬁghting between the
resident neuroscientists, or were slowed by self-imposed strictures
concerning proper objects of disciplinary study. While our group
did, eventually, have to make some concessions to “normal” neu-
roscientiﬁc practices in the laboratory, our initial brainstorming
was relatively unbounded by disciplinary constraints and previ-
ous training.7 However, and overall, as Nicholas Burk notes in
his study of “traditional” and “interdisciplinary” post-doctoral
students, “if credibility is a discipline-speciﬁc construct (Turner,
2006; MacMynowski, 2007), then collaborators from different
research communities, insofar as they represent their discipline,
are put into the difﬁcult position of deciding when to com-
promise their own ideals and values at the behest of another”
(Burk, 2010, 12).
Our complicated positionality had everything to do with the
relative weight of neuroscientiﬁc knowledge necessary for the run-
ning of an fMRI study. Methodologically, “neuro-collaboration”
felt like it was amounting to “neuroscience.” This recognition
played a large role in our sense of DDC as we found ourselves
ﬂoating in and out of logics, expertise, and authority. Despite
the length of our time together as a team, our formal training
in neuroscience only amounted to about three days in Vienna.
After only a month interim, our group (which now included a
resident neuroscientist) was asked to present our experimental
7During the design phase of the experiment, Littleﬁeld held an expert position
concerning the history of lie detection research. The group was able to use this
knowledge to craft a design that could potentially trouble paradigms that have
been used in lie detection research for over a century. Likewise, during the design
phase, and during the behavioral portion of the experiment, Tonks’ knowledge of
behavioral psychology played a key roll in establishing situations that would create
in-group/out-group dynamics; his expertise was also necessary for the selection of
the various measures we used throughout the behavioral experiment.
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design paradigm to the MINDLab at Aarhus University. This was
not an enviable position: faced with an experienced lab group
of about twenty faculty, post-docs, and graduate students, our
group members were not feeling particularly expert. The intent
behind the presentation was not to break down the group, but to
build up our study; however, the effect of the daunting task left
many of us wondering if we had the ability to discuss 2x2 factorial
design, pilot studies, behavioral measures, and stimulus timing.
The meeting resulted in several changes to the original experi-
mental design: we were urged to consider gender parity, choir
singing as a Danish competitive activity, and the addition of in
group/out group dynamics to increase the socially stressful feeling
we wished to invoke. While our group certainly discussed each of
these suggestions – and ultimately agreed to change the study in
light of them – we were not expert enough at the time to know
the impacts of each change on our study, especially given that only
two of us [Tonks (clinical psychologist) and Dietz (neuroscien-
tist)] had previously completed studies involving human subjects
research.
As a team, we were aware that our position as expert-novices
placed us into some risky territory: without a system of checks-
and-balances. How would we know if the software for the fMRI
paradigm was working correctly? Was the galvanic skin response
being recorded in tandem with the stimulus? Even (something as
simple as) ensuring that the data was being saved/archived cor-
rectly seemed monumentally difﬁcult. In practice, and while we
were in the hospital’s MRI bunker, the division was keenly felt.
The entire team actively participated in the preparation for data
collection: making sure participants followed safety procedures,
providing them with prescribe stimulus before the fMRI scan, and
debrieﬁng them after their participation was completed. Notably
absent, though,was our team’s collective participation in the actual
scanning portion of the data collection. We observed each partici-
pant; we asked questions about the images and data that appeared
on the numerous screens; we even received a lesson in setting up
some of the software for the anatomical scan; ultimately, Dietz
completed the scanning of each subject. Although our expertise as
scholars in other ﬁelds made us keenly aware of vague global con-
cerns (is the data being saved correctly?), we were relatively impo-
tent when it came to translating these concerns into action. And,
indeed, when we ran the experiment the ﬁrst time (in Nov/Dec
2010), we received the bad news shortly thereafter: our data was
useless; software for the new MRI machine had not been prop-
erly calibrated to synchronize our participants’ stimuli with their
responses.
Despite this setback, the team remained intact and we re-ran
the experiment a second time in Sept/Oct 2012, this time gathering
usable data. During the second experimental trial we inhabited our
DDC differently. Instead of accepting an expert-novice status that
left several of us feeling disempowered, we re-embraced our expert
status as scholars in disparate ﬁeldswith a larger pool of experience
from which to draw. Looking back – particularly at the pictures
of our team (quite literally) trying on lab coats during a quiet
moment in the bunker – it becomes clear that DDC can be used
as both an excuse to defer responsibility to another expert and/or
ﬁeld and as a motivation to recall and deploy one’s own expertise.
When we re-ran the experiment, the non-neuroscientists on our
team took on a more active roll in checking and balancing the
paradigm software construction and the data collection. While
we still could not run the equipment, we learned more about
running the software and initiated a more effective system of
checks and balances that more effectively integrated our expert-
novice position. In this case, DDC did not disappear, did not
defer, but instead began to more subtly texture the process of data
collection.
By recognizing the potential of neuro-collaborations to trans-
form knowledge in the humanities and social sciences and vice
versa, one cannot enter such a doubly experimental space with
the assumption that one’s “home” discipline will be (or should
remain) untouched by the transdisciplinary collaboration. In their
essay on the current state of environmental research, Marleen
Buizer, Bas Arts, and Kasper Kok have argued for the recog-
nition of a wider-range of actors in theirs and – by extension,
we would argue – other ﬁelds. “Like planning, environmen-
tal governance and associated theories of scale have witnessed
shifts toward a greater involvement of a highly diverse set of
“knowledge developing” actors, such as experts and practition-
ers, policy makers and citizens, professionals and laypersons”
(Buizer et al., 2011). Buizer et al. (2011) also make the argument
that transdisciplinary research groups are more self-sustaining
if members remain reﬂexive throughout the process. They note
“we ourselves could only make progress after we had explicated
the truth claims that we found generally embedded in our dis-
ciplinary backgrounds and in our own positions with regard
to these” (Buizer et al., 2011). However, and as Buizer and her
colleagues note, the most productive collaborations involve the
recognition of a “diverse set of “knowledge developing” actors” and
reﬂection concerning the embedded truths of disciplinary knowl-
edge claims. Each of these acts are best accomplished through
collaborative efforts that enable one to highlight the strengths
and weaknesses of one’s training and the disciplinary assump-
tions we each typically use to ground ourselves. Partnerships
between neuroscientists, social scientists, and humanists not only
offer a system of checks and balances, but the potential for
collaborative problem solving that relies on future knowledge
production.
Neuro-collaborations have the potential for the recognition
and reﬂection outlined by Buier; they also have the potential
to create new knowledge, particularly when individual actors
are – at least partially – freed from the strictures of disciplinar-
ity. This is not to say that disciplinarity is inherently constrictive,
or that it would be possible to fully step outside of one’s own
training. We are not suggesting that the academy should lose
all boundaries and encourage underprepared researchers to run
MRI magnets or engage in ethnographic work. What we are sug-
gesting is that when scholars are asked to work outside of their
home disciplines, they have the potential to inhabit other forms of
consciousness, and in particular to be novices again: to ask ques-
tions, draw novel comparisons, and propose ideas that are not
automatically restricted by the baggage of disciplinary training.
Neuro-collaborations – like the novel collaborations highlighted
in our introduction – have potential, in part, because of the
unorthodox, andpotentially risky, formsof consciousness they can
inspire.
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ANALYST OR A BLOB OF ONE’S OWN8
Retrospectively, we would argue that neuro-collaboration is dou-
bly experimental – insofar as doing neuroscience while also
bringing social, cultural andhumanistic targets into an experimen-
tal mode of knowledge production is itself a kind of experimental
practice (see Roepstorff and Frith, 2012) that can help to develop
DDCamong themembers of a transdisciplinary team. The analysis
phase of our experimental endeavor necessarily meant analyz-
ing data, but it also meant looking backward at our experiment
and experience to (re)evaluate the conscious and unconscious
narratives we developed to explain our positionality. We found
thatwhile neuro-collaboration involves establishedneuroscientiﬁc
paradigms, it can also challenge them.
At the outset of the experiment we brought distinctive dis-
ciplinary consciousnesses and experimental expectations to the
Vienna Neuroschool: the opportunity to interact with MRI scan-
ners; the potential to win the experimental contest; the space to
do some informal “ﬁeldwork” among budding neuroscholars, and
the very practical possibility of networking, making connections,
and advancing our careers. If we are honest with ourselves, we
all hoped to ﬁnd something – maybe even make a scientiﬁc dis-
covery – or, at the very least identify activation, ideally in exactly
the “right” place. Indeed, in our pursuit of a viable experiment, it
becomes easier and easier to think like neuroscientists, rather than
like transdisciplinarily deployed neuro-collaborators. In the end,
some of us wondered whether we were so intent on ﬁnding some-
thing that we lost – or, at the very least, forgot about maintaining –
our critical edge. And here, again, is the problem of DDC magni-
ﬁed: we do not, and never have, presumed that neuroscientists are
lacking a“critical edge”; wewould not concede that the humanities
and/or social sciences are the only disciplines with a purchase in
critical, reﬂexive thinking; nor would we assume that in ﬁnding
something that we had somehow betrayed our home disciplines’
skepticism and deep ambivalence about the natural sciences. And
yet, all of these assumptions came to bear on our ﬁnal experi-
mental discussions and the write-up process that followed data
analysis.
Within the paradigm of the ENSN, our work made sense; out-
side of this small transdisciplinary network and the Neuroschools
that fostered our development, we were each left with the respon-
sibility of constructing our own narrative about what kind of
research we were engaged in and how it related to our home dis-
ciplines. Constructing such narratives was easier for some group
members than others. Indeed, the humanist and sociologist of our
group were the most overtly conﬂicted. For Littleﬁeld, who lives a
double life already (being jointly appointed across collages in an
English Department and a Kinesiology and Community Health
Department), this experiment was a reiﬁcation of her daily aca-
demic existence and sense of DDC. Her fMRI experience was easy
to translate to the Kinesiology Department; indeed, it brought her
a measure of credibility with the scientists in the ﬁeld. But with
her English colleagues, Littleﬁeld often had to justify her scientiﬁc
8We sometimes referred to this brain activation as “a blob of one’s own”: a phrase
that captured a layman’s view of fMRI images tinged, ever so slightly with a certain
deference to the potential transgression recorded by Virginia Woolf ’s “A Room of
One’s Own.”
research, which ostensibly appeared somewhat hypocritical. Had
she not founded her career critiquing scientiﬁc studies of lie detec-
tion (Littleﬁeld, 2009, 2011)? At these moments, Littleﬁeld felt
that she was defying her training and/or her predetermined aca-
demic role: she was expected to play the critical humanist, but
instead she was the experimental scientist. Holding both posi-
tions concurrently required an elaborate narrative that framed the
fMRI study as critical, as a new type of “neuro-collaboration.”
If framed properly, this particular explanation could capture
the liminal: a position that would recognize the potential
for simultaneity and similarity of humanistic and scientiﬁc
pursuits.
As a sociologist of the life sciences, trained within a tradi-
tion that has been (and often with good reason) hostile to the
methods, assumptions and reductions of the natural sciences,
Fitzgerald was among those increasingly convinced that the inter-
pretive social sciences still needed to ﬁnd some more constructive
and mutual engagement with the life sciences – and especially
with the emerging genomic and neurobiological sciences. This
often placed him at odds not just with colleagues and friends,
but with the most fundamental assumptions – for example, about
the ontological primacy and explanatory power of “the social” –
of his home discipline. And yet, when he worked among neuro-
scientists, Fitzgerald found that he did not experience any more
comfort or any greater sense of familiarity – indeed, he found him-
self precisely inhabiting his narrow disciplinary training, worrying
about when or where we would acknowledge the fundamentally
social, even “constructed,” nature of the whole experience. Thus,
for Fitzgerald, his DDC was not manifest in a doubled perspec-
tive, or being temporarily dislocated – but rather in a sense of
being never at home. Among his sociological colleagues, he was
attracted to the materiality and ﬂexibility of biological accounts;
among the neuroscientists, he insisted on the primacy of culture
and society; this sense of betweenness as a condition-in-itself
became, for Fitzgerald, the most potent experience of his own
double-consciousness.
Beyond the narratives we crafted for our colleagues (and our-
selves), we had to address the write-up of the experiment: what
could we say – how much of the trick could we give away –
and still be able to seek publication in a neuroscientiﬁc journal?
While this was no Sokal Hoax (Sokal, 1996), our experimental
impetus was not entirely pure. As you will recall, we planned
(in our idealistic moments) to challenge an established paradigm
of neuroscientiﬁc lie detection. When we did ﬁnd activation in
areas of the brain associated with ToM and the social brain we
had some difﬁcult decisions to make: would we add to the lie
detection literature by offering up a way to improve experimental
paradigms? (How) would we make the case that our experiment
complicated lie detection experimentation? What community of
scholars would be interested in our ﬁndings and why? Would
we tell a different – more true? more accurate? – story in our
Science and Technology Studies papers than in our neuroscience
paper? In short, how would we craft our various narratives and for
whom?
For the purposes of our arguments here, the answers to these
questions matter less than the positionality of the authors. Indeed,
we came to realize that many of these questions were the result
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of a sense of “disciplinary double-consciousness” – the experi-
ence and feeling of being trained in one discipline and deployed
in another as ambassadors and interlocutors or as saboteurs
and spies. As a team, we were certainly divided; as individual
researchers, many of us experienced the strongest sense of DDC
at this juncture. We had worked for ﬁve years to get to this point.
We wanted to feel triumphant; instead, we felt conﬂicted. On
the one hand, we felt pressure to prove that our experiment(s)
worked, that our neuro-collaboration was successful: we had man-
aged to create new neuroscientiﬁc knowledge. On the other hand,
we wanted to illustrate the potential for neuro-collaboration –
one that could preserve a sense of doubling and deployment.
Yet, by this ﬁnal stage, the social scientists and humanist among
us felt somewhat deﬂated: if we published our results then, in
some respects, our attempt at neuro-collaboration could trans-
mogriﬁed into, simply, neuroscience. As we tried to come to
terms with these conﬂicted positions, we were forced, yet again,
to re-consider the history of our collaboration and the resulting
product.
CONCLUSIONS: NEURO-COLLABORATION(S) AS THIRD
SPACE
In his essay on the history of double consciousness, Bruce argues
that one “cure” for double consciousness9 might be a kind of syn-
thesis, or a blending, that did not devolve into either of its parts.
To us, in all its awkwardness and optimism, this sounds like an
early version of the transdisciplinarity agenda that we – and oth-
ers (Frazzetto and Anker, 2009) – have been in search on behalf of
a neuro-collaborations.
Du Bois’s mentor William James had speculated on the possibility of
a real cure for alternating consciousness involving not the victory of
one over the other but a process whereby“the dissociated systems came
together,” resulting in a third, new Self, “different from the other two,
but knowing their objects together.”FrancisWayland, in his earlier text,
had cited a case of just such a cure of “double consciousness,” one in
which a young woman’s recovery was marked by“the blending together
of the knowledge acquired in [her] separate conditions.”
(Bruce, 1992, 303)
While James’ argument mitigates the political edge of what Du
Bois would come to call “double consciousness,” we can ﬁnd in
his basic concept – as in discourses surrounding transdisciplinar-
ity – the suggestion of a paradigm shift: “a process whereby “the
dissociated systems came together,” resulting in a third, new Self,
different from the other two, but knowing their objects together”
(303). As of yet, the process of reaching this synthesis is unclear;
however, through our experiences on a transdisciplinary research
team, we have come to better understand several dimensions of
DDC, as well as the potential for awkwardly, and perhaps wor-
ryingly apolitically, “blending together the knowledge acquired in
[our] separate conditions” through the further development of
neuro-collaborator as a live-able third position.
Importantly, we have not found a Jamesian cure for DDC; but
neither, in retrospect, were we seeking such a cure. Our case study
9Bruce makes it very clear – as have other scholars before him – that Du Bois himself
was not in search of a “cure” for doule consciousness. The quote that follows in this
paragraph is from the perspective of William James, not W. E. B. Du Bois.
in neuro-collaboration illustrates that the process of collaborative
blending necessitates the development of DDC. That – far from
limiting neuro-collaborations –DDCmakes possible the processes
by which scholars from disparate ﬁelds can come to understand
a third position, “different from the other two, but knowing their
objects together.” Seeing multiple sides, understanding the poten-
tial for failure, recognizing the potential for a transformation of
disciplinarity; all of these are made possible through a dissociation
from one’s home discipline – a deployment – that results in and
helps produce transdisciplinary perspectives. Indeed, we would
argue that to ﬁnd oneself “at home” in a new discipline, to be quite
settled and to therefore not experience DDC is anathema to good
neuro-collaboration as we conceive it.
Given that neuro-collaborations are an active – yet thus far
largely indeterminate – area of study, we propose the following
deﬁnition: neuro-collaboration results from speciﬁcally transdis-
ciplinary (whether in practice or intent) collaborations between
neuroscientists and other scholars from a variety of disciplines;
these collaborations center on the central nervous system in all its
rhetorical, social, and biological facticity and ﬂexibility, in order
to redeﬁne pre-existing notions of disciplinarity and also of neu-
roscholarship itself, thus, simultaneous with the production and
interpretation of biologicalmeasures, generating spaces for critical
reﬂection and dialog about neuroscientiﬁc practices and repre-
sentations, as well as the social and humanistic representation
with which those practices (even implicitly) are invariably in dia-
log. Neuro-collaboration, as we deﬁne it is not about creating
neurodisciplines (e.g., neuroaesthetics, neurohistory, neuroan-
thropology, neuroeconomics, etc), but about the theorization of
their construction, harnessing of potential for mutual engage-
ment, andopposition to their being exhausted by one-dimensional
neuro-discourses. We realize that this deﬁnition is an ideal; that,
in practice, neuro-collaborations rarely produce perfect partner-
ships between the neurosciences and other disciplines; that there
are problems of access and funding, and training that need to be
overcome; and that they are often cultivated within an academic
landscape that actively hierarchizes different ways of producing
knowledge. In particular, a wider sense of intellectual openness
and generosity must be further cultivated if this way of thinking
about neuroscholarship is to become at all practicable. With these
caveats in mind, we propose our deﬁnition as a goal rather than a
descriptor.
Because of the academy’s tendency to value the more posi-
tivistic sciences over the social sciences and humanities, part-
nerships between the neurosciences and other disciplines can
easily turn into uni-directional monologs. Collaboration is too-
often achieved through addition (“add a humanist/ethicist to the
research group and stir”), rather than transformation; access typ-
ically means making fMRI hours available to a broader range
of research groups instead of reinventing infrastructures and
training opportunities; and critical reﬂection is often limited to
reviewing representations of research (in the media, for exam-
ple), instead of rethinking research paradigms and fundamental
assumptions. In each case, transformation, reinventing and
rethinking necessitate paradigm shifts, not quick ﬁxes. The practi-
cal question, of course, is how to achieve multi-directional dialogs
that will result in transformation, reinvention, and rethinking.
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In creating our narrative, we have attempted to represent the
good and the bad, the moments of failure (Fitzgerald et al.,
2014), as well as the potential for success, and – in particu-
lar – the very real problem of disciplinary double-consciousness
that has left us questioning neuro-collaboration from the
inside-out.
From our perspective, the emergence of initiatives that have
the potential to become neuro-collaborations, such as the HBP
and the BRAIN Initiative, are and will continue to be a force in
disciplinary re-negotiations. Deployment across disciplinary lines
creates opportunities for the members of each research group (in
the form of employment, grant opportunities, etc), it also shapes
colleagues’ conceptions of what is possible. Indeed, part of our
hope in writing about our experimental experience in the con-
text of neuro-collaboration is to recognize the difﬁculty – nay,
impossibility – of the transdisciplinary partnerships of which we
speak unless academic institutions (including funding structures,
hiring lines, publications practice, and so on) are at least partially
restructured in such a way as to generate more breathing-room for
potentially risky collaborative scholarship.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported by the University of Illinois Research
Board, the Center for Advanced Study, and the Kinesiology
and Community Health Department at the University of Illi-
nois, Urbana-Champaign; Center for Integrative Neuroscience
and Mind Lab at Aarhus University; the European Neuroscience
and Society Network; and the Danish Agency for Science, Tech-
nology and Innovation’s University Investment Grant (MINDlab).
The authors would like to thankAndreas Roepstorff, Nikolas Rose,
Giovanni Frazzetto, and the editors of this special issue for creat-
ing spaces in which questions about the neuro- can be posed. We
would also like to thank the Frontiers reviewers for their excellent
suggestions.
REFERENCES
Barry, A., and Born, G. (2013). Interdisciplinarity: Reconﬁgurations of the Social and
Natural Sciences. New York and London: Routledge.
Benton, T. (1991). Biology and social science: why the return of the
repressed should be given a (cautious) welcome. Sociology 25, 1–29. doi:
10.1177/0038038591025001002
Bruce, D. D. Jr. (1992). W. E. B. Du Bois and the idea of double consciousness. Am.
Lit. 64, 299–309. doi: 10.2307/2927837
Buizer, M., Arts, B., and Kok, K. (2011). Governance, scale, and the environment:
the importance of recognizing knowledge claims in transdisciplinary arenas. Ecol.
Soc. 16, 21–38. Available at: http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss1/art21/
Burk, N. (2010). The Discipline of Identity: Examining the Challenges of Developing
Interdisciplinary Identities Within the Science Disciplines. Ph.D. thesis, University
of Montana, Communication Studies, Missoula.
Choudhury, S., Nagel, S., and Slaby, J. (2009). Critical neuroscience: Linking
neuroscience and society through critical practice. Biosocieties 4, 61–77. doi:
10.1017/S1745855209006437
Choudhury, S., and Slaby, J. (2011). Critical Neuroscience: A Handbook of the
Social and Cultural Contexts of Neuroscience. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. doi:
10.1002/9781444343359
Collins, H., Evans, R., and Gorman, M. (2007). Trading zones and interactional
expertise. Stud. Hist. Philos. Sci. A. 38, 657–666. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2007.09.003
Du Bois, W. E. B. (1994). The Souls of Black Folk. Mineola: Dover Publications
[1897/1903].
Fitzgerald, D., Littleﬁeld, M. M., Knudsen, K., Tonks, J., and Dietz, M. J. (2014).
What it actually feels like to do a ‘transdisciplinary’ neuroscience: ambivalence,
equivocation, and the politics of experimental knowledge. Soc. Stud. Sci. (in
press).
Frazzetto, G. (2011). Teaching how to bridge Neuroscience, society, and culture.
PLoS Biol. 9:e1001178. doi: 10.1371/journal.pbio.1001178
Frazzetto, G., and Anker, S. (2009). Neuroculture. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 10, 815–821.
doi: 10.1038/nrn2736
Galison, P. (1997). Image and Logic: A Material Culture of Microphysics. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Gammel, I. (2012). Lacing up the gloves: women, boxing, modernity. Cult. Soc. Hist.
9, 369–390. doi: 10.2752/147800412X13347542916620
Ganis, G., Kosslyn, S. M., Stose, S., Thompson, W. L., and Yurgelun-Todd, D. A.
(2003). Neural correlates of different types of deception: an fMRI investigation.
Cereb. Cortex 13, 830–836. doi: 10.1093/cercor/13.8.830
Gieryn,T. (1983). Boundary-work and thedemarcationof science fromnon-science:
strains and interests in professional ideologies of scientists. Am. Soc. Rev. 48,
781–795. doi: 10.2307/2095325
Gieryn, T. (1996). Policing STS: a boundary-work souvenir from the Smithsonian
exhibition on ‘Science in American Life.’ Sci. Technol. Hum. Values 21, 100–116.
doi: 10.1177/016224399602100105
Gieryn, T. F. (1999). Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Human Brain Project. (2014a). “Overview.” Available at: https://www.
humanbrainproject.eu/discover/the-project/overview (accessed December 6,
2013).
Human Brain Project. (2014b). “What People are Saying.” Available
at: https://www.humanbrainproject.eu/discover/the-project/overview (accessed
December 6, 2013).
Hurley, J. (2003). “Introduction: organization and scientiﬁc effectiveness,” in Sci-
entiﬁc Research Effectiveness: The Organizational Dimension, ed. John Hurley
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers), 5–9.
Jack, J. (ed.) (2012). Neurorhetorics. Rhetoric Society Quarterly. London and New
York: Routledge.
James, W. (1890). Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1. New York: Henry Holt and Co.
doi: 10.1037/10538-000
Johnson, J., and Littleﬁeld, M. M. (2011). Lost in translation: popular neuroscience
and the emergent neurodisciplines. Soc. Reﬂect. Neurosci. (Adv. Med. Soc.) 13,
279–297.
King’s College London. (2007a). “About ENSN.”Available at: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/
sspp/departments/sshm/research/ensn/ENSN-About.aspx (accessed February 26,
2013).
King’s College London. (2007b). “Neuroschools: Introductions and Aims.” Available
at: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/sshm/research/ensn/neuroschools/
Neuroschools.aspx (accessed February 26, 2013).
Kuhn, T. (1970). The Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Lacey, N. (2010). Psychologizing Jekyll, demonizing Hyde: the strange case of
criminal responsibility. Criminal Law Philos. 4, 109–133. doi: 10.1007/s11572-
010-9091-8
Langleben, D. D., Loughead, J., Bilker, W., Ruparel, K., Childress, A., Busch, S., et al.
(2005). Telling truth from lie in individual subjects with fast event-related fMRI.
Hum. Brain Mapp. 26, 262–272. doi: 10.1002/hbm.20191
Langleben, D. D., Schroeder, L., Maldjian, J. A., Gur, R. C., McDonald, S.,
Ragland, J. D., et al. (2002). Brain activity during simulated deception: an
event-related functional magnetic resonance study. Neuroimage 15, 727–732. doi:
10.1006/nimg.2001.1003
Littleﬁeld, M. M. (2009). Constructing the organ of deceit: the rhetoric of fMRI and
brain ﬁngerprinting in post-9/11America. Sci. Technol. Hum. Values 34, 365–392.
doi: 10.1177/0162243908328756
Littleﬁeld,M.M. (2011).The Lying Brain: LieDetection in Science and Science Fiction.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Littleﬁeld, M. M., and Johnson, J. M. (2012). The Neuroscientiﬁc Turn: Transdisci-
plinarity in the Age of the Brain. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
MacMynowski, D. P. (2007). Pausing at the brink of interdisciplinarity: power and
knowledge at the meeting of social and biophysical science. Ecol. Soc. 12, 20.
Meloni, M. (2013). Biology without biologism: social theory in a postgenomic age.
Sociology (online ﬁrst). doi: 10.1177/0038038513501944
Mills, V. (2011). The Museum as ‘Dream Space’: Psychology and Aesthetic Response
in George Eliot’s Middlemarch. 19: Interdisciplinary Studies in the Long 19th
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 149 | 10
Littleﬁeld et al. Contextualizing neuro-collaborations
Century.Available at: http://www.19.bbk.ac.uk/index.php/19/article/view/596/713
(accessed May 15, 2013).
Mohamed, F., Faro, S., Gordon, N., Platek, S., Ahmad, H., and Williams, M. (2006).
Brainmapping of deception and truth telling about an ecologically valid situation:
FunctionalMR imaging andpolygraph investigation-initial experience. Radiology
238, 679–688. doi: 10.1148/radiol.2382050237
National Institutes of Health, BRAIN Initiative. (2014). “Why Is This Needed?”
Available at: http://www.nih.gov/science/brain/why.htm (accessed December 6,
2013).
Nicolescu, B. (2008). Transdisciplinarity: Theory and Practice. New York: Hampton
Press.
Ortega, F., andVidal, F. (2012). NeuroCultures: Glimpses into an Expanding Universe.
New York: Peter Lang International Academic Publishers.
Penny, S. (2008a). “Bridging two cultures: towards an interdisciplinary history of
the artist-inventor and the machine-artwork,” in Artists as Inventors/Inventors as
Artists, eds Dieter Daniels and Barbara U. Schmidt. Hatje Cantz: Berlin.
Penny, S. (2008b). Rigorous interdisciplinary pedagogy: ﬁve years at ACE.
Convergence 15, 31–54. doi: 10.1177/1354856508097017
Pickersgill, M. D., and Van Keulen, I. (eds). (2011). “Sociological reﬂections on the
neurosciences” in Advances in Medical Sociology, Vol.13, Bingley:Emerald.
Porter, A., and Youtie, J. (2009a). How interdisciplinary is nanotechnology?
J. Nanopart. Res. 11, 1023–1041. doi: 10.1007/s11051-009-9607-0
Porter, A., and Youtie, J. (2009b). Where does nanotechnology belong in the map of
science? Nat. Nanotechnol. 4, 534–536. doi: 10.1038/nnano.2009.207
Pruchnic, J. (2008). Neurorhetorics: cybernetics, psychotropics, and the materiality
of persuasion. Conﬁgurations 16, 167–197.
Racine, E., Bar-Ilan, O., and Illes, J. (2005). fMRI in the public eye. Nat. Rev.
Neurosci. 6, 159–164. doi: 10.1038/nrn1609
Roepstorff,A., andFrith,C.D. (2012). Neuroanthropology or simply anthropology?:
going experimental as method, as object of study, and as research aesthetic.
Anthropol. Theory 12, 101–111. doi: 10.1177/1463499612436467
Rose, N. (2013). The human sciences in a biological age. Theory Cult. Soc. 30, 3–34.
doi: 10.1177/0263276412456569
Rose, N., and Abi-Rached, J. M. (2013). Neuro: The New Brain Sciences and the
Management of the Mind. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sokal,A. (1996). Transgressing the boundaries: towards a transformative hermeneu-
tics of quantum gravity. Soc. Text 46/47, 217–252. doi: 10.2307/466856
Spence, S., Farrow, T., Herford, A., Wilkinson, L., Zheng, Y., and Woodruff,
P. (2001). Behavioral and functional anatomical correlates of deception
in humans. Neuroreport 12, 157–164. doi: 10.1097/00001756-200109170-
00019
Spence, S., Hunter, M., Farrow, T., Green, R., Leung, D., Hughes, C., et al.
(2004). A cognitive neurobiological account of deception: evidence from func-
tional neuroimaging. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. Biol. Sci. 359, 1755–1762. doi:
10.1098/rstb.2004.1555
Turner, B. (2006). Discipline. Theory Cult. Soc. 23, 182–186. doi:
10.1177/0263276406062698
Williams, S., Byrke, L., and Benalow, G. (eds). (2003). Debating Biology. New York
and London: Routledge.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was conducted
in the absence of any commercial or ﬁnancial relationships that could be construed
as a potential conﬂict of interest.
Received: 14 January 2014; paper pending published: 08 February 2014; accepted: 27
February 2014; published online: 31 March 2014.
Citation: Littleﬁeld MM, Fitzgerald D, Knudsen K, Tonks J and Dietz MJ (2014) Con-
textualizing neuro-collaborations: reﬂections on a transdisciplinary fMRI lie detection
experiment. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:149. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00149
This article was submitted to the journal Frontiers in Human Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2014 Littleﬁeld, Fitzgerald, Knudsen, Tonks and Dietz. This is an open-
access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
(CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided
the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 149 | 11
